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Baruch Spinoza was born at Amsterdam in 
1632 of Portuguese Jewish parents. In accordance 
with the wishes of his father he was carefully ed­
ucated by the Rabbis of his own people in Hebrew 
theology and literature including of cuurse the 
Talmud and the more modern commentaries of Maim- 
onides and Ibn Ezra. He was also sent to the 
Latin school of Van den Ende, an Amsterdam physi­
cian, where he received his first impulse to the 
study of Descartes ' philosophy and his first les­
sons in the principles of natural science. After 
he grew to manhood suspicions of his orthodoxy 
were raised and after several attempts to induce 
him to conform to the faith of the synogogue had 
failed he was expelled from the Jewish community 
in 1656. Henceforth he provided for himself a 
slender bu£ sufficient income by grinding and 
polishing lenses for optical instruments, while 
devoting the remainder of his time to the devel­
opment of his own philosophical ideas.
His love of independence led him to
j
i
i
k  • ---
t
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
g
i
I
I decline the Heidelberg professorship of philosophy
i
>.
I offered him by Karl Ludwig, the Elector Palatine.\
i He wrote his principal works at the Hague between
I the years 1660 and 1667. In 1663 he published the
i
treatise entitled: "Renati Descartes principorum 
philosophical Pars I et II more geometrico demon- 
stratae, and in 1670 the anonymous work: "Tractatus 
Theologico - politicus", in which he discusses and- 
gives rationalistic solutions of such problems as 
inspiration, prophecy, miracles and free investi­
gation. His chief work, Ethica more Geometrica 
Demonstrata and several other less important treat­
ises were published after his death under the care 
of his friend, Ludwig Meyer* His "Tractus de Deo, 
Homine, ejusque Felicitate" was unknown to the phil­
osophical public until 1852.
Difficulties of Interpretation.
The philosophy of Spinoza would be a 
difficult and subtle one to state even were it 
completely formulated: as he left it, the articu­
lation and dependence of its parts are not perfect.
ii — _
■')
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Distinctions are frequently reiterated to become
clear cut only gradually; sometimes it seems as
e
if definitions are modified in repetition. Ex­
tension and thought are defined only after repeat­
ed explanations have been made clear, how these 
attributes are to be distinguished from the tra­
ditional ones and what correlation and contrast 
there is to be between them. Sometimes the diffi­
culty seems to be one of expression, for though 
the language is tersely exact and beautifully 
accurate it bears the marks of painful revision. 
Since there is so much misunderstanding it seems 
probable that the work of revision may not have 
been perfected or completed. But possibly the 
fault is not Spinoza rs and if what he means by 
idea, seems to be labored to its final conception 
through the whole length of Book II of the Ethics, 
the confusions may not have come from any vagueness 
in his mind, but from the variety of senses in 
which we have been reading that word since his time.
In expression as well as ideas Spinoza 
stands between two ages. Within his lifetime
vJ
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I even the language he used, had come to have differ-
£
| ent meanings. He is a contemporary .of the first
i of the philosophers we have come to call modern,
| but in a significant sense his intellectual fel-
| lowship is with the mediaevals* This place which
he occupies in the history of thought is another 
source for much of the strange interpretation that 
I has been found for his doctrine and his termin-
I! ology. He was concerned largely with problems|
which occupied the attention of his predecessors; 
and except in rare instances, the statements he 
cited with approval from the works of his contem­
poraries pleased him for other reasons and be­
cause of other implications than those which their 
authors had mostly tried to. bring out#
Sometimes the difficulty and the confu-
I,
| sion of Spinoza's writings are genuine problems
| which yield no solution* He was faced, to take
an example, with the problem of the relation of 
; finite bodies and God. In the "Short Treatise",
i which was his first work, it seemed a simple
problem and^he disposed of it thus: "Now to prove
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
] that there is a body in Nature, can be no difficult
ia
| taabt for us. The proof requires only a knowledge
1 of God and of his attributes”. Fifteen years later
■S
] a correspondent, Tschernhaus, raises that problem
I in almost the same terms: "In the first place I
I
I can conceive only with difficulty how the exis-|
tence of bodies which have motion and figure can
I be demonstrated a priore; since nothing of the
i
sort occurs in extension considering the thing 
absolutely.” (Ep.80) To which Spinoza replies:
"If extension be conceived as Decartes conceived
! it, that is, as a quiescent mass, it is not only
difficult but impossible to demonstrate the exis­
tence of things.” (Ep.81) Tschernhaus recognizes 
and expands on the difficulties in the case of 
Descartes, but asks Spinoza to indicate ”how the 
variety of things can be shown a priori from the 
concept of extension according to your medita­
tions." (Ep. 82) He answers that the variety of 
things cannot be demonstrated from the concept 
of extension, but that it must necessarily be 
explained through an attribute which expresses 
eternal and infinite essence. This position
I
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IaI
1 and statement were those which in the "Short
I
I Treatis^ seemed to him the solution of the problem.
IC
I "But," he adds now, "I shall treat of these things 
1 with you more clearly some day if life be suffi­
cient. For up to the present I have been able to 
put nothing concerning these matters in order."
(Ep. 83) Apparently his life was not sufficiently 
long enough to remove the difficulties. But it 
had been long enough to indicate that the confi­
dent statement of the Short Treatise was the 
statement and not the solution of the problem; 
bodies are related to the attribute of extension; 
but the mechanism to mediate between bodies and 
j extension was never set in order. There are 
other such definite outlines in the Ethics which 
were never to be filled in.
| Consequently there are enough elements
j of confusion gathered about the works of Spinoza.
t
; But it does not seem too much to hope that the 
:■ coherent, logical form which he strove so defin-
i
! itely and consistently to confer upon his philos- 
; ophy, can be recovered in at least the detail
i
i  that he gave it. Restatement of that unity is
J
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
needed, particularly since it can be made with an 
emphasis determined by criticism to which he 
could not have anticipated. "From the method 
Spinoza employed and from the confidence he 
had in the efficacy of deductive or synthetic 
reasoning, one is led to expect that the answer 
will be a consistent and autonomous doctrine.
It may be incomplete in some details, for the 
unity is a formal one, and concerned therefore, 
not with the specific inclusion of everything 
that is known, but rather with the conceivable 
si manner in which anything that may be known is to
be included. To say this is only to insist on 
Spinoza's firm conviction that the search for 
truths could be conducted with profit only after 
one had investigated what is implied in the fact 
that we can conceive a truth or can desire that 
which we conceive to be good. Then one may 
j] speak of the power of the intellect and the strength
! of the emotions. Such an insistence will bring
] out forcefully what is involved in his philosophy
■3
I
and will recognize, too, as a proper consequence
:ij
! of this philosophy that in the age which was to
go into madness of observation and experimentation
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.Reproduced with
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he could appraise Bacon's little stories and 
insist that Boyle 's experiments revealed and 
could reveal nothing which was not already known 
about that nature of things.” jyicKeon, Philosophy 
of Spino za, p. 188.
Method
In developing his doctrines, Spinoza 
is not content with pure deductive reasoning 
but presents them in geometrical manner. Prom 
a certain number of definitions he deduces a 
system whose parts are logically connected with 
each other. This method of Exposition is not 
an arbitrary form or a provisional framework; 
it is of a piece with the system and constitutes 
Its permanent skeleton. When Spinoza treats of 
the 'world, of man and his passions as Euclid in 
his Elements treats of lines, planes and angles, 
it Is because, in principle and in fact, he sets 
as great value upon these objects of philosophy 
as the geometer upon his. And just as the con­
clusions of geometry invariably follow from their 
axioms, so the moral and physical facts 'which the 
philosopher considers, follow with absolute nee-
permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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? sssity from the nature of things, expressed by
| their definitions. He no more inquires into their
5 final causes than the geometer asks to what end
[j
( the three angles of a given triangle are equal
! to two right angles. It is not his method that
I •
| leads him to mathematical determinism; on the
p contrary, he employs it because from the very
ji
I outset he views the world from the geometrical,
!j
j ‘ that is, the deterministic standpoint. He agrees 
p with Pythagoras, Plato and Descartes that philos-
fj
I ophy is the generalization of mathematics. How-
j
j ever, to the writer of this thesis, this georaet-
j rical form adds little to Spinoza's work, and in
I many respects it is a real drawback, for it gives
to his profound insights an appearance of artifi-
[
| ciality which tends to obscure their real meaning.
But Spinoza believed that mathematics furnished 
! the universal type of true science, and he assumed
that the absolute certainty which was then re­
garded as essential to science, could only be 
attained by following the same method. What is 
most valuable in his system is not the result of 
his formal deductions, but the fruit of his gen­
ius as shown through his wonderful speculative
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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I.i:
| intuition and keen psychological analysis*
ii
i
Man's Place In Nature
{
>
t
j Notwithstanding its severe scientific
I
? form Spinoza 's philosophy is based on ethical
li?
I motives, and has a decidedly practical character.
What he sought throughout his life of lonely nud- 
ilation was not knowledge as the mere satisfaction 
of intellectual curiosity, but rather knowledge 
of m a n ’s place in the universe. In the ’’Improve­
ment of the Understanding” we find an autobiograph 
ical account of Spinoza’s decision to choose the 
lightest end of life. After explaining the un­
satisfactory nature of a life devoted to pleasure 
or honor or riches, and the evils and disturban­
ces to which such a life is subject, he says:
"All of these arise from the love of what is 
perishable, such as the objects already mentioned. 
But love toward a thing eternal and infinite feeds 
the mind wholly with joy and is itself unmingled 
with any sadness. Wherefore it is greatly to be 
desired and sought for with all our strength.” 
(Opera Posthuma, p. 135.) Moreover ’’whatsoever 
in the sciences does not serve to promote our
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
j1 1 .
object will have to be rejected as useless."(idem 
p. 185) Nevertheless there is for Spinoza no op­
position between theory and practice; for the 
knowledge of the systematic unity of all things, 
and of God as their source and essence, is itself 
the supreme good and blessedness for man. The 
highest good is realized only in and through the 
most complete knowledge.
Prom this conception springs his ethical 
doctrine, developed in the third, fourth and fifth 
parts of the Ethics. In its practical form his 
teaching assumes that everything, so far as in it 
lies, strives to remain in its own being. The 
effort by which this striving is manifest is nothing 
but the actual essence of the thing. This effort 
when it is in the mind alone is will; when in mind 
and body, it is appetite. If desire is satisfied 
we have; pleasure, if not, we have sorrow. All 
affections and emotions resolve themselves into 
desire, joy and sorrow, accompanied by ideas.
A thing is not desired because it is good; it is 
good because It is desired. Knowledge of good and 
bad can be a cause In the moral world, counteract­
ing passion, and raising us from the world of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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|
iI
| appetite and mortality to the world of eternal
j
j truths. Hence, it is with the problem of m a n ’s
place in nature - his relation to God or the total 
system of things, and the possibility of his free-
l
| dom depends upon his first recognizing that man is 
j a part of nature, and that his mind, like every-
I thing else, is subject to uniform natural laws.
I
| Man forms no kingdom within a kingdom. It is not
I contingency or some strange power of free will
| which governs his mental experiences; but here
as elsewhere all takes place according to law and
I necessity. "Nature’s laws and ordinances whereby
i
all things come to pass and change from one form 
to another are everywhere and always the same. 
There should, therefore, be one and the same 
method of understanding the nature of all things 
whatsoever, viz., through nature’s universal lav/s
and rules I shall consider human actions and
desires in exactly the same manner as though I 
were concerned with lines, planes and solids." 
(Eth.I - 16) From this standpoint he gives a 
scientific account of the origin and nature of 
emotions, showing how they necessarily arise from
|
certain assignable causes and how their intensity 
depends on definite natural conditions. The var-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
f
| ious emotions are all found.to be compounds of the
f
| primary states: pleasure, pain and desire* But
| this reduction of the emotions to law is only a
| preliminary step in Spinoza’s treatment. To attain 
freedom it is first necessary to recognize the bond­
age of man, the fixed determination of the emotions 
I through natural laws. But just as knowledge is 
power in regard to external nature, so we can free 
ourselves from the emotions by understanding their 
laws.
The mind is, after all, something'more 
than a series of passive states. Its essence con­
sists in an effort to preserve its own being and 
promote its own good* In carrying out this pur­
pose it finds that nothing is so serviceable as 
knowledge. Through knowledge It is possible to 
free man from the bondage of the emotions. An 
emotion when understood becomes transformed and 
ceases to be a state of passivity. Moreover, 
when the conditions of an emotion are understood,
It is possible to arrange and associate the var­
ious emotions in such way as to strengthen and 
promote the occurence of those that are desirable 
and to weaken and repress those which are hurtful.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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The highest kind of knowledge for Spinoza is not 
scientific reason but intuition, the direct in­
sight that all things follow necessarily from the 
nature of God and hence from one system.
God and Nature
The logical foundation of his whole 
system lies in the validity of all relative pro­
positions leaving the Absolute as the sole reality 
of the universe. All turns with Spinoza as with 
Descartes on getting true and adequate knowledge 
of the essences of things. All essences when 
presented to the mind, carry with them a convic­
tion of their own truth, and as they cannot con­
tradict one another they form a system of truths 
deduced from one principle as their primary cause* 
Such a principle can only be God, from whose qual­
ities all the essences of things flow as a matter 
of necessity, of in other words are caused, since 
Spinoza does not distinguish between logical de­
pendence and dynamic causation. In this way his 
logic passes over Into his metaphysics and in 
attempting to determine the cause of things Spin­
oza has to determine the essences of things and 
their relation to the Highest Reality.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I This Highest Reality he calls at the be-
\ ginning of his Ethics either God, or Nature, or
j Substance* An attempt has been made to distinguish
I three stages in the development of his thought,
| each one finding its characteristic expression in
i
| each of these words. The attempt fails not only 
because there is not sufficient regularity in us­
age but also because the triplicity of standpoint 
is fundamental. It is God who is Nature, and it 
is Nature which is Substance; and the different 
words appear as the matters dealtwith, change and 
change about. The three primary problems of thought 
are those of origin, structure and stuff. Vi/hen 
Spinoza is thinking of the first he would seem to 
prefer the word God, when of the second - Nature, 
and when the third - Substance. They are all one 
and the same, and are only different from different 
points of view. This is really the argument of the 
earlier propositions of the Ethics just as it was 
of the Short Treatise.
Substance
I The Short Treatise took over the con-
1
J ception of Nature and showed that if taken ser-
5
iously it is one with God. Nov/ the Ethics takes
f
?
i
I!
!
I
L. —  - - -----------
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over the word Substance, a favorite word in ' 
current thought, and shows that Substance and God 
are one. The point is simple. The traditional 
phisosophy had spoken of substances as if each one 
of them were independent and selfcontained. Spin­
oza insists that such self-contained entities do 
not as a fact exist. All things are bound to­
gether inextricably. Hence, if only that which 
can stand by itself is substance, there is only 
one substance - the system of the whole universe. 
This system as being infinite - self-coherent and 
self-complete - is one with the eternal self suf­
ficient and self-subsistent being called God.
What was asked from the conception of Substance 
is in fact only given by the idea of God and so 
Spinoza can say in his 14th proposition: "Apart 
from God there is not, nor can there b& conceived 
any substance." (Ethics 1-14-0- There can be only 
one real Substance because a Substance is defined 
as self-contained and only the whole of things is 
self-contained. Everything less than the whole 
is dependent on something else. Even Descartes 
saw that his two substances were dependent on God 
who was the basic substance, and therefore were 
not substances in the same sense as God. But if 
substance is really self-dependent, it must be all
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
f that is* And if it he all that is, it must be un-
'i
j limited; for to be limited is to be limited by
| something, and hence to depend - at least for its
\
| limitations - on something else* But the whole of
•D
| being has nothing outside of it to limit it and
I hence is unlimited. Spinoza calls this, infinite-
(I ness. The essence of an infinite substance is to
I have all possible attributes* An attribute is the
. if
j| essence of a substance as perceived by the intel-
| lect and the intellect has two such attributes;
| thought and extension. Therefore God is a thinking
j and extended substance as we know him; but since he
if
j! is infinite, he must be much more besides. The
{
f basis then of the parallelism between mind and body, 
ideas and things, is their fundamental identity in 
Nature or God.
j
The changes which go on in Nature, then,
| are manifested now as ideas, now as things. As
j our minds are a collection of ideas, there must
\
be corresponding to them collections of things or 
bodies; and contrariwise, if the object of the idea 
I constituting the human mind be a body, nothing in 
| that body could happen which would not be per-
j ceived by the mind. Now, as a matter of fact,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1 the object of the human mind is a hody, to wit, the
j human body, for all our ideas of the external world
1
j are modified by our sense organs at least. Man
|
{ becomes both body and mind. Some of our ideas of
I
j our body are obscure, others are distinct; but
j Spinoza in a scholium (Sth. II - 10th) to his the­
orem proving our dual nature, indicates that there
is a parallelism between certain characters of the 
j body, e.g., its activity, its perceptual acuity, 
its independence of other bodies - and of the mind- 
its power of forming many perceptions and distinct 
■ concepts. Unfortunately, he does not elaborate 
this point.
The one substance then is God or Nature
i'
[ with its two attributes of thinking and extension
| among the many others. These two attributes were
!
[ in the eyes of Spinoza's contemporaries not only
i.
[ different but "opposite”. Thus mind was considered 
! to be all that was active, creative, purposeful, 
free; and matter all that was passive, inert, mech­
anical and determined. So that Nature seemed to 
have contradictory properties. Could one thing 
have these two sets of properties and still be one? 
Spinoza in Ethics I, proposition 29 reviews the 
I Neo-Platonic conception of natura naturans and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I natura naturata both fused in one* It means that
ii Nature is not created by a power outside itselfi
| but, being subject only to its own laws is both
I creator and created. It is both active and pas-
1 sive, not in the sense that as an agent it is dif-
I ferent from acts upon itself as patient, but in
I the sense that it "just grown" or happens in accor-
1 dance with physical law, and that since physical
| law prescribed for it by a supernatural power, it -
is autonomous, making, so to speak, its own laws.
| The distinction implied in the words "agent" and
| "patient" 'was necessitated not by logic but by
certain scientific presuppositions. It was pre­
supposed, as early as Empidocles, that a change 
implied a changer and something to be changed.
If now there was no changer, then the changed must 
be both agent and patient. It was another manner
t
| of saying that Nature was sovereign. And we can
j
I easily see how easy it was by emphasizing the
materialistic side of Nature, to make Spinoza an
atheist, or by emphasizing the mental side to make 
a pantheist.
Attributes and Modes
Spinoza realized the problem that confront 
ed him. He was to connect this Sovereign Nature, '
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
this Being, or Principle which is rigidly one with 
the multiplicity of things and persons constituting 
the world of imagination. This he does by positing 
intermediate aspects of the One* God being self- 
caused and therefore infinite must have infinite 
aspects or attributes* As previously mentioned, 
two only of these are known to man: extension and 
thought which sum up the world as humanly known. 
These attributes are perfectly parallel one to the 
other, all portions of extension or space, having 
attached to them, as it were, corresponding ideas 
or thoughts, though these in Spinoza’s curious 
psychology are not necessarily conscious and cer­
tainly not self-conscious. But these attributes 
being infinite, like their substance, cannot con­
stitute finite beings which are due to modifica­
tions of these attributes or modes as he calls them.
These modes then are infinite like the 
attributes they modify. Movement, intellect and 
will, the physical universe and the intellectual 
universe have neither beginning nor end. Each 
one of the infinite modes constitutes an infinite 
series of finite modes. Movement, i.e., infinitely 
modified extension, produces the infinitude of 
finite modes which we call bodies; intellect and
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will becoming infinitely diversified, produces 
particular and finite minds, intellects and wills. 
Bodies and minds, that is, ideas, are neither 
relative substances, which would be a contradic­
tion in terms, nor infinite modes, but changing 
modes or modifications of the cosmical substance, 
or, what amounts to the same, of its attributes.
By distinguishing between infinite modes ■ 
and finite modes, Spinoza means to say that motion 
is eternal, while the corporeal forms which it con­
stitutes originate and decay - that intellects and 
wills have existed for eternities, but that each 
particular intellect has a limited duration. Bodies 
or limited extensions are to infinite extension, 
particular intellects to the infinite intellect, 
and the particular wills to the eternal will, what 
our thoughts are to our soul. Just as these exist 
only for the soul, like the body exists only for 
the substance of which it is a momentary modifica­
tion. Compared with God, souls and bodies are no 
more substances than our ideas are beings apart 
from ourselves. In strictly philosophical language, 
there is only one substantive; everything else is 
but an adjective. The substance is the absolute,
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I 22.
S
f
|
! eternal, and necessary cause of itself; the mode is
[ contingent, passing, relative and merely possible*4
j
I The substance is necessary, that is, it exists be-
| cause it exists; the mode is contingent and merely
i
possible, that is, it exists because something else 
exists and it may be conceived as not existing*
The cosmic substance mentioned above is
fr
| an extended and thinking thing; it forms both the
* substance of all bodies or matter, and the sub-[ 7
stance of all minds. Matter and mind are two dif­
ferent ways of conceiving one and the same substance; 
two different names for the same thing. Each of the 
I attributes of the substance is relatively infinite*
i.
The substance is absolutely infinite in the sense
I
| that there is nothing beyond it: the attribute is
I
j only relatively infinite, that is after its kind,
j Extension is infinite as such, and thought is in-
i finite as such; but neither extension nor thought
is absolutely infinite, for alongside of extension 
there is thought, and alongside of thought there 
; is extension not counting such attributes of sub­
stance as are unknown to us. Substance as such is 
the sum of all existing things; extension, though 
infinite as extension, does not contain all exis­
tences in itself, since there are in addition to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
| it, infinite thought and the minds constituted by
j
j it; nor does thought embrace the totality of beings
| since there are besides, extension and bodies.
!i
j Spinoza's God seems to be both an unqual­
ified being, and an infinitely qualified being* By 
calling God an absolutely undetermined being he does
j not mean to say that God is an absolutely indeter-
i
| minate being, or non-being, or negative being, but ■
t
on the contrary that he has absolutely unlimited 
attributes or absolutely infinite perfections, - 
that he is a positive, concrete, most real being, 
the being who unites in himself all possible at­
tributes and possesses them without limitation.
'i;
I God is therefore no longer conceived as
t!
| having separate attributes, which would make him
| a particular being; he is the being who combines
i
; in himself all possible attributes or the totality
|
i  of being. Now each divine attribute constitutes
a world: extension - the material world; thought - 
the spiritual world. Hence-, we must conclude
i from the infinite number of divine attributes that
there exists an infinite number of worlds besides 
the two known to us - worlds which are neither 
material nor spiritual, and have no relation to
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| space or time, but depend on other conditions of
i
| existence absolutely inaccessible to the human
(
j understanding* This conception opens an immense
!
| field to the imagination, without being absolutely
s
| contrary to reason. However, it must be added
strictly speaking: infinita attributa are bound-
| less attributes rather than innumerable attributes.
| 'Had Spinoza been decided on the question as to
t
! whether the absolute has attributes other than ex­
tension and thought he would evidently not have 
employed an ambiguous expression. (Vidi Ep.,63)
3 fact his substance has extension and thought 
only, but it has them in infinite degree.
Spinoza's God is not an object outside 
the world, which together with the world makes up 
the universe. He is himself the universe within 
which the distinctions and differences constituting 
the world obtain. And if so, he is among other 
things inevitably and irrevocably extended.
It is easy to inveigh against a doctrine 
which identifies God with the universe and which 
sees in the essential characters of the one, essen­
tial characters of the other. Yet it must be re­
peated that the universe, according to Spinoza's
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conception of it is for more than the physical 
world. His God is the fulness of being, the sup­
reme reality. Such characters, therefore, as con­
stitute the Real as we know it must constitute, 
at least in part, the essential nature of God. 
Spinoza is trying to give content to the word God 
and whatever one may think of the result it is 
.indubitable that few have made the attempt in so 
forceful and noble a fashion.
. i
God then conprises all things, and that 
of the free necessity of his own nature, not as 
the result of any passing whim or caprice, yet 
He is not their mere framework, a passive contain-
: er or conserver. He is their active source. "It
t
!' is as impossible for us to conceive of God as not
existing as to conceive of him as not acting." 
(Eth.II - 3 sch. ) "There are bound to follow from
I
j the necessity of the divine nature an infinity of
things in an infinity of ways - - - and since all 
things are in him, there can be nothing outside
1 him by which he is determined or compelled to ac-
| tion, and therefore he acts from the laws of his
own nature only and is compelled by no one. Hence 
it follows firstly, that there is no cause which 
can excite God to action, either extrineiially
I
i
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I or intrinsically except the perfection of his own
1 nature; and secondly, that God alone exists from
M
the necessity alone of his own nature.” (Sth.I -16) 
The whole scheme of Spinoza Ethics may possibly be 
indicated in the accompanying diagram as found in 
the Jewish Encyclopedia. Vol. XI. p. 515.
iI
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Now we pass to the last part of this 
paper: Spinoza’s Ontological Proof of the Exis­
tence of God* In its main outlines Spinoza inher­
ited the ontological proof of the existence of God 
from the middle ages. St. Anselm (1033 - 1109) 
was the first one to announce this proof. He is 
a typical scholastic doctor and a fine exponent 
of the alliance between reason and faith which 
form the characteristic traits of mediaeval phil­
osophy. He assumes a priori that revelation and 
reason are in perfect accord. These two manifes­
tations of the one and supreme intelligence cannot 
possibly contradict each other. Anselm lived in 
an age -when practically every one believed in a
] God from revelation. Hence we find that he did
f
i
\ not consider himself under any obligation to prove
I
| what Descartes thought was a necessary point in
t.
connection with the ontological proof; that is,
i
| whether all men are possessed of an idea of supreme
being. Anselm draws the elements of his argument 
from St. Augustine and Platonism. He sets out from 
an idea of perfect being, from which he infers the 
existence of such a being. It is a platonic doc­
trine to say that God does not get his perfections 
from without; he has not received them and we can-
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
not say that he has them; he Is and must be all 
that these perfections imply; his attributes are 
identical with his essence. Goodness, an attribute 
of God, and God, are not two separate things. This 
is a necessary preliminary to the ontological proof 
of the existence of God, as understood both by 
St. Augustine and Spinoza.
The ontological proof of the existence of 
God must be considered an important one, It has 
appealed to so many great thinkers that one simply 
cannot dismiss it without a hearing. No less a 
g&nius than Albertus Magnus, Peter of farentais, 
Henry of Ghent, Guanillo, St. Thomas, Richard of 
Middleton and Sant find it necessary to refute it; 
while on the other hand an equally long list of 
great thinkers have accepted it in the main, e.g.,
William of Auxerre, Richard Fishaere, Alexander of
I
| Hales, John Peckham, Bonaventure, Giles of Rome,
1 John Duns Scotus, William Ware, Descartes and Hegel.
The argument can be stated in a variety 
of ways: first, you cannot have an idea of a per­
fect being unless that being exists. Second, the 
being of which you have the idea is not a perfect 
being unless it exists. Third, if you imagine the
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1 case of a perfect being that does not exist, then
■1I that being would not be perfect unless it exists
| and if it did not ttxist then you could not have an
| idea of it. Fourth, perhaps the best statement of
1
1 the question is the one that indicates its vaiid-
I ity as being as resting on the principle of contra-
ji diction: you either have the idea of a perfect
| thing or you have not. If you admit that you have\
j an idea of a perfect being you are also conceding
that you cannot think of a perfect being that has
I
not real existence, otherwise you would be thinking 
! or having an idea of an imperfect being, since a
1 being that possesses all perfections and has real
existence is more perfect than such a being that 
has only possible existence. St. Anselm would say 
that I am forced to assent to the reality of a 
perfect being just as in every judgement I assent 
to a real order of things to which I infer my judge­
ment applies. I am continually jumping from the 
logical to the real order. I am continually making 
outward reference; what right have I to do this in 
any instance? This is one of the most difficult 
problems in philosophy. Philosophers differ as to 
why I feel compelled in one instance and not in 
another. St. Anselm holds that when I judge God
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to have real existence this is the one and unique 
instance where the very terms in the judgement 
carry their own guarantee* The very nature of the 
term "Perfect Being" once it is completely under­
stood forces the mind to assent to the reality.
If there is a hill there must be a valley; if there 
is an equilateral triangle the angles must be equal 
The best statement of this argument is found in the 
"Prosolgium Sive Pides Quaerens Intellectum": Certe 
id quo cogitari nequit, non potest esse in solo 
intellectu. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est 
potest cogitari esse et in re, quod majus est. Si 
ergo id quo majus cogitari potest est in solo in­
tellectu, id ipsum quo majus cogitari potest. Sed 
certe hoc esse non potest existg^ergo procul dubio 
aliquod quo majus, cogitari non v*let et in intel­
lectu et in re." St. Guanillo, St. Thomas and 
Kant objected to this argument on the grounds 
that if I have an idea of a golden mountain or a
perfect island neither the mountain nor the island
need to exist. Kant said if I have an idea of a
thousand Talers that does not put the money in my
pocket. It seems obvious that this objection over­
looks' the most important feature of the argument. 
The case of a perfect being - God - is unique.
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I
'.'•I I can think of a Golden Mountain or of a perfect
I island having a real or possible existence, but
I I cannot think of an absolutely perfect being as
I having real or possible existence because a per-
\SJ
1 ' feet being that had only possible existence would
I not be perfect* Another objection that has been
| brought against this argument is that it is a
i J
) .jump from the ideal to the real. But Anselm would 
| answer what harm is there in the jump? If you
should accuse him of attributing things in your 
mind to things outside your mind, he would .say: 
"Certainly, that is what it is all about* The
trouble lies in the word jump. It may be illog­
ical; where then is there the break in the logic?
| To say that there is a jump from the ideal to the
I "I real order, is not a refutation.
i
I.
[
\ When we come to Spinoza we find him
i
| wording the argument in a much more abstruse man­
ner but in a way that he himself thought was better. 
Spinoza, like Xnselm, places the divine order first, 
both in the order of knowledge and in the order of 
nature. Therefore he held that all philosophy 
should begin with the nature of God. But he is 
faced with the problem how to arrive at the divine 
nature as the first certainty. In all this Spinoza
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ii
i
j was following mediaeval traditions. Spinoza, as
| was said previously in this paper, felt the necessity
j
| of putting a mathematical framework into philosophy
]
t
j and following the method of axioms and definitions.
Like Anselm he wished to arrive at the existence
|
j of God from postulates without placing an a poster-
| iori element in his argument. Like the scholastic
! he feels that the world can only be understood
j
j through and in the nature of God. Spinoza’s method
tf
[ as he sums it up himself is: "Nothing else but
| reflective knowledge or the idea of an idea.1' (De
Intellectus Emendatione, c. 7.) Concerning this 
dictum, Sir Frederick Pollock in his book, "Spinoza: 
His Life and Philosophy" page 126, says,"Now the 
| reflective knowledge which has for its object the
idea of the most perfect being is more excellent 
than any other. This idea, then, is the ultimate
I
i object of the mind's pursuit.... Thus the ’idea of
the most perfect being1 includes, if it is not 
equivalent to, the belief that the whole nature of 
things is one and uniform. Now this is the very 
first principle of all science....In knowing the 
'most perfect being1 the mind knows itself aspart
of the universal order and at one with it: therein
finding, as we have to learn elsewhere, the secret
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j of man's happiness and true freedom." It is here
j
j  that Spinoza parts company with Anselm. Spinoza
I understands by idea first of all a conscious state
i|
| of the knowing mind, in which the object is repre­
sented ‘without explicitly knowing this idea the 
mind may know the object* We can see by this 
blending, Spinoza has in view the identification 
{ • of the human mind and its object, the universe a
most perfect being, when the idea of the most per­
fect being is the object of a reflective act, i.e. 
the Idea of an idea. Plainly this means when we 
reflect on the idea of God,, we recognize that the 
most perfect being includes both the mind and the 
extended universe. It is doubtful whether this 
method is justifiable. In the first place an en­
tirely new meaning is attached to the word "idea".
j Second, the term, idea, it its older sense as having
I
j a representative character is replaced in the argu-
I
! ment by the newer meaning without sufficient evi­
dence and explanation of its support. V/e must not
j be too dogmatic on this point, because after all,
Spinoza was one of the greatest thinkers of all 
times, and his way of expressing himself on this 
very difficult point may be unfortunate; but it 
looks like an example of the fallacy of equivoca-
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tion. Professor McKeon, in his book: "The Phil­
osophy of Spinoza", attempts to give logical value 
to Spinoza's jump from the ideal to the real order. 
The whole matter is extremely difficult but he 
deals with it skillfully and profoundly. His words 
are: "Logically it can be stated in a variety of 
ways: any discourse marks off a realm of discourse
in such wise that any consistent statement indicates 
a real and intelligible nature. Or stated more rig­
orously: a postulate may be formulated such that
from it and from the definitions involved it its 
statement a proposition may be deduced concerning 
the nature of the reality in which such a postu­
late is possible; the truth of that proposition 
would follow not from assent to the postulate but 
from the very existence of the postulate. For 
thinking to be possible, it is said in effect, 
there must be an infinite perfect being. But to 
formulate such a postulate is an act of thought; 
it must, according to its own statement, be referred 
to a perfect intelligible being who is implicated 
in any statement. Yet knowledge of his nature will 
be independent of the truth or falsity of other 
statements; in fact, although the being of God is 
first indicated in these statements, once it is
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(
j knov/n such knowledge will not depend on the truth ;j
i
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I or falsify of the statements, but on the contrary 
their truth or falsity will depend on the nature 
of God. Even the primitive postulate is no longer 
postulated but is made apodictic by the better at­
tested truth of God's existence." The question of 
the existential status of terms in logic has received 
a great deal of attention among modern logicians; 
Bradley, Bosanquet, Joseph, Keynes and Coffey have 
treated it at some length. They are all very diffi­
dent about arguing from consistency in the realm of 
logic to objective reality. In "The Science of 
Logic" (I, 53) Coffey says: "It must be a realm
which is not only present to, but also indepen­
dent of, the individual thinker's actual thought, 
and to which an appeal can be made to verify his 
judgments about things the2'-ein."
} It would seem that the first requisite
|
i of a reality in which any postulate is possible is
1 that it be independent of the thinker's actual
i
! thought. Even as the "idea of an idea" must be
checked by an a posteriori relation. '.Whether this 
is absolutely true or not the present writer feels 
that he is not in a position to pass judgment.
:!
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| !
] However the fact stands that every judgment has j
j j
predicate which refers us to some objective sphere j
which is a portion at least of all conceivable j
reality. In this sense every judgment implies the
existence or reality of its ultimate subject. Whether
it is possible to find a subject or predicate which
has existence beyond its possibility or conceivabil- !
j
ity, the present writer is unable to say. And even j
:i
though a postulate may be imaginary through and . !
through, it must refer to some sphere of reality; j
The realm of imagination may be called merely pos- j
sibility; but the merely possible must have some I
existence. It may be that to proceed from a postu- \
I
late which indicates the nature of the reality in i|
which such a postulate is possible is merely to ask j
the mind to make or construct that which will fit 
the requisites of a preconceived definition; in the 
case of the ,rOntological Proof of the Existence of 
God" the Idea of a perfect being would remain purely 
mental or ideal, and so in the realm of logic which 
made possible the existence ofthepostulate. What 
Anselm or Spinoza would say to this modern objection j
it is impossible to tell and the present writer 
feels sure that he has nothing new to add.
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